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Abstract:  This study applies a regional public goods approach to the study of energy market 
integration (EMI) in East Asia, with a view to clarifying the outlook for such integration and the 
likely obstacles to be encountered.  In addition to drawing on theoretical ideas relating to regional 
public goods, the paper will also draw on the experience of the European Union in its attempts to 
develop a single energy market.  The study shows that many services are needed in order to develop 
and sustain a regional integrated energy market and that some of these services have characteristics 
of regional public goods, though some may also be trans-regional or global in nature as well.  The 
study recommends that: EMI in East Asia should be pursued in an incremental manner and mainly at 
a sub-regional scale; and the specific steps taken towards EMI should be chosen on the basis of their 
likely positive economic impacts and their likely ease of delivery. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
The integration of energy markets across the region is one of three major priorities 
for regional energy collaboration identified by the EAS Energy Ministers.  The 
successful development of an integrated energy market across East Asia should yield 
significant economic benefits (ERIA, 2010).  More specifically it would allow national 
governments to more easily address the four main energy policy challenges which face 
any country, namely: 
  Security of energy supply and/or demand; 
  Economic efficiency of the energy sector; 
  Social equity, particularly access to affordable modern energy; 
  Reduced emissions of pollutants from energy production and use. 
Improvements in all these four aspects of energy management across the region 
through energy market integration (EMI) would yield both direct economic benefits in 
terms of economic growth as well as producing a number of positive externalities.   
These benefits have the character of public goods in that they are unlikely to be 
provided by private actors and, in the absence of government action, are liable to under-
provision or over-use.  Given that the intended market integration extends across a very 
wide region, the benefits of such market integration can be considered as regional public 
goods or even as trans-regional public goods. 
The aim of this paper is to apply a regional public goods approach to the study of 
EMI in East Asia, with a view to clarifying the outlook for such integration and the 
likely obstacles to be encountered.  This will provide a framework for prioritising the 
component tasks of EMI.  In addition to drawing on theoretical ideas relating to regional 
public goods, the paper will also draw on the experience of the European Union in its 
attempts to develop a single energy market. 
The report starts with a brief account of the energy challenges facing East Asia and 
the potential for an integrated energy market to address these challenges.  This is 
followed by a short explanation of the distinctiveness of energy and energy policy, with 
reference to the public good elements of energy.  The paper then provides an account of 





which forms the framework for the subsequent analysis.  The experience of the 
European Union is then examined briefly before the framework of regional public goods 
is applied to EMI in East Asia. 
 
 
2.  Key Energy Challenges Facing East Asia 
 
The EAS region accounts for about 25% of world GDP in nominal terms, but the 
population is some 45% of the total.  The EAS also forms a significant part of the 
world’s energy system.  It accounts for more than one-third of global commercial 
energy consumption and about 40% of carbon dioxide emissions (Table 1).  The 
production and consumption of coal and of natural gas are roughly in balance, but the 
region is a major net importer of oil.  As remaining reserves of oil and natural gas 
become progressively concentrated in areas outside the EAS region (e.g. the Middle 
East and C.I.S.), a growing share of energy demand is likely to require imported energy.  
Thus long-term security of energy supply is a priority for most countries in this region, 
regardless of their level of development.  The richest countries seek to maintain their 
level of wealth, the rapidly developing economies seek to sustain their rate of growth, 
whilst the poorest states need energy to support the first steps of modernisation and to 
supply their people with basic amenities.    
Although security of supply and social equity are probably the main national and 
regional energy policy concerns, economic and technical efficiency are also important 
because inefficiency can undermine measures taken to address the former two 
objectives.  Environmental objectives are also becoming increasingly important across 
the region.  The high level of coal reserves and the consequent reliance on coal, 
especially in China and India, exacerbates the challenges these countries will face in 
constraining emissions of carbon dioxide, nitrogen oxides and sulphur oxides, as well as 
land and water pollution.  The increasing exploitation of offshore oil and gas and the 
growing volume of energy transported across the seas of the region all enhance the risk 





use of renewable energy can both act to address many of these challenges, they require 
the appropriate technology to be available and appropriate economic incentives.  
 
Table 1.  EAS Share of World Commercial Energy Reserves, Production and 
Consumption, 2009 
 Reserves  Production  Consumption 
Oil 3%  10%  31% 
Natural Gas  8%  12%  13% 
Coal 31%  65%  65% 
Energy consumption      36% 
Electricity generation      36% 
CO2 emissions    41%   
Source:  BP Statistical Review of World Energy, 2010.  
Note:  Numbers are rounded. 
 
In many respects, there is a very large degree of disparity between countries across 
the region, for example: 
  The political and economic systems and ideologies, and in the legal systems; 
  The state of development of the economy; 
  The structure and rate of growth of the economy; 
  The scale and mix of the primary energy resource; 
  The scale, mix and rate of growth of energy supply and demand; 
  The relative importance of net imports and net exports of energy; 
  The structure and ownership of the energy industry, and the nature of energy 
markets, especially with respect to energy pricing; 
  The state of the energy infrastructure and the proportion of the population with 
access to modern energy; 
  The energy intensity and scale of carbon dioxide emissions. 
For the purposes of this analysis, four groups of countries may be recognised on the 
basis of their stage of economic development, economic structure, energy consumption 
and carbon emissions (Table 2).  The first group comprises OECD countries with 
advanced economies plus Brunei, with relatively high per capita energy consumption 
and carbon emissions, and with the capacity to invent, develop and deploy new 
technologies.  Australia and Brunei are distinguished by their status as net energy 





region, China and India, which have in common their large populations, high degree of 
dependence on coal and high energy intensity.  Both countries have the capacity to 
develop and deploy new technologies. 
The third group spans a variety of ASEAN countries which are at various stages of 
economic development between the richest and the least developed in the region.  All 
members of the group are net importers of energy, with the exception of Malaysia.  
Energy intensities are relatively high, and per capita energy consumption is relatively 
low.  Capacity to develop and deploy new technologies varies between these countries. 
The final group comprises the three least developed members of ASEAN which are 
distinguished by their low level of industrialisation, of per capita energy consumption 
and of per capita carbon emissions. 
This diversity is the source of many of the regional energy challenges and yet at the 
same time provides some of the opportunities.  The over-arching objective of EMI in 
the EAS region is to bring net economic benefits to the region through increasing 
energy cost competitiveness, energy security and developing cleaner energy.  At the 
heart of this vision lies the concept of economic efficiency, which has three aspects in 
this context (Bannister et al., 2008): 
  Productive efficiency, which relates to the cost of producing a certain amount of 
energy; 
  Allocative efficiency which reflects the overall benefit to society from the 
supply of energy, and is determined by the pricing system that provides signals 
to energy users; 
  Dynamic efficiency is achieved by an appropriate balance between short-term 
and long-term concerns, and this particularly relies on encouraging investment 
in the extraction of energy resources, in the construction of new energy 





Table 2.  Selected Features of Population, Economy and the Energy Sector 
 



















  Millions  Billion 
2000 US$  US$ % Mtoe Toe  %  Toe/Million 
2000 US$  Mt-C  
  2007 2007 2007 2007  2007  2007  2005 2005 2005   
              
Australia 21 503  23,936  27  122  5.8 44.5  260  103.4  4.9 
Brunei 0.4  7  17,944  71  2.4  6.3  0  366  1.4  3.5 
Japan 128  5,206  40,745  30  526  4.1  21.1  106  342  2.7 
Korea 48  734  15,158  37  218  4.5  23.8  342  136  2.8 
New Zealand  4  64  15,178  25  17  4.1  11.6  277  8.7  2.2 
Singapore 4.5  134  29,185  30  31  6.7  0  272 18.7 4.1 
                   
China  1,318 2,387 1,811  48  1,497  1.1  72.6  791  1,386  1.05 
India 1,124  771  686  29  380  0.3  54.8  578  329  0.29 
                   
Indonesia 225 233  1,033 27  135  0.6  18.8 650 90.6 0.40 
Malaysia  26  133  5,009 48  59  2.2  10.5 576 42.4 1.63 
Philippines  89  107  1,202 32  37  0.4  15.3 392 20.4 0.23 
Thailand  67  174  2,594 45  90  1.3  11.8 573 52.1 0.78 
Vietnam  85  53  617  42  27  0.3  29.8 609 22.9 0.27 
                   
Cambodia 14.4  7  495  27  1.3  0.09  18.2  225  1.0  0.07 
Lao  6  2.7 450 31  0.6  0.09  5.8 219 0.3 0.05 
Myanmar 49  17 347 16  4  0.1  7.8 343 2.9 0.06 
Source:  Kimura, 2009. 
Note:  Statistics have been rounded for simplification, and are for illustrative purposes only.  
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Efficiency may be the concept which underpins the drive for EMI, but investment 
and trade are the key activities within the energy market which should lead to the 
realisation of the desired benefits.  Investment is needed to exploit energy resources, to 
build infrastructure, and to develop and deploy new technologies.  Trade which takes 
energy from exporters to importers enhances the energy security of the importers and 
can underpin economic development of both importing and exporting states.  In certain 
circumstances, energy trade can reduce the environmental impact of energy production 
and use, and can lower the cost of energy supply (World Bank, 2008). 
A recent study has shown that the liberalization of regional trade and investment 
and of national energy markets should yield substantial positive gains for the EAS 
region as a whole, in terms of GDP growth and carbon dioxide emission reduction 
(ERIA, 2010).  This analysis showed that all the EAS countries should see positive GDP 
benefits, though many countries experience an overall growth of carbon dioxide 
emissions resulting from the economic growth.  The study also argued that an integrated 
energy market requires not only trade and investment liberalisation, but also linkage of 
energy infrastructure, reform of domestic pricing systems for energy and liberalisation 
of national energy markets.  However, such is the highly politicised nature of energy 
that these steps towards EMI, and their component tasks, are likely to prove very 
challenging to implement.  
 
 
3.  The Distinctiveness of Energy and Energy Policy 
 
The energy industry is distinct from any other sector of the economy.  It is a key 
input to all economic activity, especially in a modern economy, and is a key determinant 
of the standard of living in all societies.  Its distinctiveness as a commercial activity 
arises from the large capital costs, the long-lead times, the economies of scale, the 
technical sophistication and the relatively high degree of risk involved.  The energy 
sector may play a very important role in the economy of a nation with respect to the 
gross domestic product, to the balance of trade, to the availability of foreign exchange, 
and to the alleviation of poverty.   
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As a consequence of the distinctiveness and importance of the energy sector, a 
responsible government cannot avoid becoming involved in the governance of the 
energy sector, regardless of the nature of the economy and of the system of national 
governance.  Markets alone cannot satisfactorily address a number of key challenges, 
for example: 
  The difficulties of promoting competition on account of the natural monopoly 
characteristics of energy networks, the role of potential monopolists and cartels, 
and the high barriers to entry. 
  The potential for the production and use of energy to cause harm to wider 
society and to the environment (‘negative externalities’). 
  The need to manage finite, national natural resources, and to gather and provide 
market information. 
The need to manage those elements of energy which have aspects of a ‘public 
good’, such as security of supply, access to basic energy services, and energy efficiency. 
Though the effective governance of energy at a national level continues to be of 
crucial importance, it is no longer sufficient; for the energy industry, the energy markets 
and the impacts of energy production and use have become transnational, regional and 
even global in scale.  Energy companies are internationalising, oil markets are global, 
gas markets are regional and growing in scale, energy supply networks span great 
distances, and environmental damage affects whole regions and even the entire globe.  
Therefore the governance of energy must also take place at levels above the nation, at 
regional, trans-regional and global scales.  
For East Asia to develop an integrated energy market across the region, new 
systems of governance must be established which span the region.  This then raises a 
number of questions concerning which aspects of energy should be governed at regional 
level and concerning the nature of the governing institutions and instruments.  Of 
particular relevance is the number of aspects of energy which have the character of a 
public good, at least in part.  These include (Hunt and Peralta, 2004; United Nations, 
2005; Asian Development Bank, 2007; Wright, 2008; Cantore, 2009;  Economic 




  Security of energy supply; 
  Emergency response;  
  The prevention of environmental damage; 
  The supply of energy to the poor; 
  The effective management of primary resources; 
  The efficient supply and use of energy services; 
  The governance of the energy sector; 
  Research and development; 
  Capacity building; 
  The provision of information. 
Although most of these energy policy priorities are normally considered as national 
public goods, they also play an important role in any regional energy market.  It is for 
these reasons that this paper explores the relevance of a regional public goods approach 
to EMI in East Asia. 
 
 
4.  Regional Public Goods: The Principles 
 
The aim of this section is to provide insight into the main attributes of regional 
public goods, under five headings: 
  Fundamental features of regional public goods 
  Aggregation technologies 
  Incentives for supply 
  Regional organisations 
  Supports and constraints for regional collaboration  
 
4.1.  Fundamental Features of Regional Public Goods 
A public good is a service or a resource which provides benefits which are non-
excludable and non-rival.  Non-excludability arises from the impossibility or 
impracticability of excluding users.  This results in over-use, especially by ‘free-riders 
who have not contributed to the production of the public good.   Non-rivalry arises from  
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the marginal cost of supplying another user being zero.  Additional users do not reduce 
the quantity of the good available to other users, and thus it is not worth spending the 
money excluding these users.  The combination of non-excludability and non-rivalry 
generally results in over-use and under-supply of a public good.  In contrast a private 
good is fully excludable and fully rival, and supply will, in theory, be efficient.  
A range of goods exist which are intermediate between purely public and purely 
private (Table 3).  Common goods are rival and non-excludable, and these are greatly 
prone to over-use.  Impure public goods may be partially rival or partially excludable.  
They can take different forms and, like pure public goods, are liable to suffer from 
under-supply and over-use.  Club goods are fully excludable, with a membership fee, 
and are often supplied efficiently.  Though they are usually intended to be non-rival, 
they can easily become partially rival if the fee is not set sufficiently high or if too many 
parties are allowed to participate.  A joint product is an activity which produces more 
than one benefit, of which at least one is a public good (Sandler, 2006). 
 
Table 3.  Classification of Public Goods, with Examples 
  Rival Partially  rival  Non-rival 
















Non-excludable Common  goods 





Impure public goods 
Ocean fisheries 
Pest control 







Source:  UNIDO (2008). 
 
The concept of a public good was originally formulated in the context of an 
individual nation, in order to show which services and resources should be provided by 
national governments.  Transnational public goods also exist and can be delivered above 
the regional level, at trans-regional and global levels.  The key distinctive feature of all 
transnational public goods is that, unlike for national public goods, no single body with  
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the authority of a state exists to ensure the supply of the good.  This therefore raises the 
challenge of collective action, through public or private parties, or both (Barrett, 2006; 
UNIDO, 2008). 
A regional public good is one which can be provided by and shared by the countries 
of a region, and which provides benefits to individual countries and to the region as a 
whole (Ferroni, 2002; Hettne and Soderbaum, 2006).  In principle, collective action by 
governments in the region should create positive spill-over effects across the region 
which are greater than those which could be generated by individual governments acting 
alone (Ferroni, 2002; Sandler, 2007).  Certain of these public goods may be quite 
limited in their geographic extent, and may be better referred to as ‘cross-border’ public 
goods (UNIDO, 2008).  Trans-regional public goods, as the term implies, benefit two or 
more contiguous regions, and global public goods, such as the reduction of carbon 
emissions, benefit the whole world (Sandler, 2007).   
One of the key difficulties in the field of transnational public goods is deciding 
which level of governance or what size of region is most suited to providing the good.  
This is the issue of ‘subsidiarity’.  From the economic perspective, the scope of the 
regional institutions established to deliver the good should match the region benefitting 
from the spill-over, and the number of countries should be as small as possible in order 
to reduce transaction costs.  This ideal may not be achievable or even desirable in many 
cases, for two main reasons: first, economies of scale may be better achieved by using 
an institution which already exists and which has a larger geographic scope than the 
specific public good under consideration; and, second, economies of scope may be 
enhanced by having one institution deliver a range of public goods (Hettne and 
Soderbaum, 2006; Sandler, 2007; UNIDO, 2008). 
Most regional public goods fall under one or more of these six headings, though a 
degree of overlap exists between them:  
1. Knowledge: for example, the provision of information, the publication of 
analyses of that information, scientific research and development, education and 
training, and dialogue. 
2.  Infrastructure: for example, the construction and operation of cross-border 
infrastructure to deliver services, and joint investment in infrastructure to gain  
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economies of scale.  Infrastructure is not in itself a public good, but rather it 
provides services which have elements of a public good (Rufin, 2004). 
3.  Environment: for example, measures to prevent pollution, to reduce levels of 
pollution and to clean-up pollution.  
4.  Health: for example, preventing or eradicating disease, and stopping the spread 
of epidemics.   
5.  Peace and security: for example, shared responsibility for providing security in 
areas of common security concern. 
6.  Governance: for example, establishing and implementing shared standards, best 
practises and policy regimes, setting up regimes to address cross-border 
problems, and creating networks of regulatory agencies.  Governance is an 
intermediate public good which is essential in order to generate the desired final 
public goods. 
 
4.2.  Aggregation Technologies 
For any public good, the key to designing effective delivery of the good is to 
understand the ‘aggregation technology’.  The aggregation technology encapsulates the 
general nature of the institutions and instruments which must be created in order to 
deliver the public good, and the nature of the aggregator depends on the nature of the 
good to be delivered.  The purpose of the aggregation technology is to provide the 
incentives for collective action to ensure sufficient supply of the public good.  The 
challenge for policy-makers is to design the institutions and instruments so as to address 
the weaknesses of the aggregation technology or to manipulate the technology (Barrett, 
2006; Sandler, 2004, 2006, 2007; UNIDO, 2008). 
Seven types of aggregation technology may be identified for regional public goods 
(Table 4).  The most basic one is ‘summation’, by which the total supply of the good is 
the sum of the contributions regardless of how much each party contributes.  All 
contributions are perfectly substitutable.  ‘Weighted summation’ resembles summation, 
except that in this case the relative importance or weight of the different contributions is 
variable.  For such types of public good, it is very difficult to ensure that all parties 
contribute.  The likelihood of under-provision is high, not least because marginal costs 
tend to rise as the amount provided by a particular party grows.   
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Table 4.  Typology of Regional Public Goods, with Prognosis for Supply 
Aggregation 
Technology  Pure Public Good  Impure Public Good  Club Good  Joint Products 













Weighted sum  Partly 
undersupplied 
Curbing spread of 
disease 
Overuse/undersupply 



















































Better shot  Undersupply or 
efficient supply 






















Sources:  Sandler (2006, 2007), UNIDO (2008). 
 
The supply of a good with ‘weakest link’ aggregation technology depends on the 
supply of the smallest contributor, just like the weakest link in a chain.  Every 
contribution is important, but the failure by just one country to supply an adequate 
quantity of the good undermines the collective effort and renders the efforts of others 
wasted.  ‘Weaker link’ technology is similar but implies that there is a gradation of 
‘weakness’ among contributors.  The risk exists that every country contributes only as 
much as the weakest country or countries, and that greater effort is expended on 
addressing the anticipated failure to provide the public good than on providing the good.  
This outcome can be avoided if the parties share common interests and goals, and if the  
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wealthier or more competent countries help the weaker states through the provision of 
money, skills or other resources.   
At the other extreme is ‘best shot’ technology, through which the total supply of the 
public good is determined by the success or actions of just one country.  ‘Better shot’ 
technology is similar to best shot, except that the impact of each contribution is 
proportional to the size of that contribution.  In principle, such aggregators avoid many 
of the challenges facing other technologies, but require coordination among the 
countries in the region to ensure that resources are not wasted by those countries which 
are unlikely to make the best shot contribution.  Problems may arise if no country is 
willing or able to deliver the good, if a country fails to deliver on a promise to deliver to 
good, or if two or more countries are vying to be the provider.  
The final type of aggregation technology is ‘threshold’ which requires a certain 
level of contribution to be made from the parties collectively before any benefit is 
realised.  If the total contribution falls below this threshold, no benefit accrues to any 
party, only costs.  Free-riding can only occur once the threshold has been reached.  
Examples include many forms of emergency response teams and facilities. 
 
4.3.   Incentives for Supply 
The provision of regional public goods requires incentives.  Collaboration which 
requires substantial and sustained commitments is likely to require a formal treaty with 
rewards and sanctions (Devlin and Mulder, 2006).  This is especially the case for most 
summation technologies which require formal institutions in order to share costs or 
allocate (tradable) property rights, and to provide for credible and substantial penalties 
in the case of failure to adhere to the terms of the agreement (UNIDO, 2008). 
Clearly one of the easiest types of regional good to supply is the club good, the 
provision of which will require a toll with possibly both a capacity charge and a variable 
charge.  Cross-subsidies may be needed for goods with weakest link aggregators.  For 
impure and pure public goods, most aggregation technologies present challenges, with 
the possible exception of best shot goods which can be effective as long as the single 
actor is able and willing to supply, and provided coordination is adequate.  Avoiding 
under-supply or over-use with other types of technology requires measures which vary 
according to the aggregation technology.  Even if a formal treaty and organisation is not  
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necessary, a degree of coordination and cooperation will be required in order to deliver 
any type of regional public good efficiently (Barrett, 2006). 
 
4.4.  Regional Organisations 
No regional organisation will have the authority of a national government because 
sovereignty lies with individual nations (Matthews, 2003).  A supra-national approach 
to regional governance in which the regional body has real authority over member states 
is only possible if the individual states are willing to cede a significant amount of 
sovereignty to this body, as is the case with the European Union.  This is rarely 
acceptable in other parts of the world.  Rather, most regional cooperation is inter-
governmental, with each state retaining veto power and with a secretariat which 
coordinates but has no authority. 
The approach taken in building regional collaboration also depends on the extent of 
integration envisaged.  At one end of the spectrum lies full market integration which 
will require a sophisticated system of rules and incentives in order to break down trade 
barriers and to ensure the free flow of goods and services.  At the other extreme, states 
can agree to cooperate in certain sectors to deliver specific regional public goods.  In 
between these two extreme lies policy coordination, or even policy harmonisation, 
which may accompany either market integration or sectoral cooperation (Matthews, 
2003). 
Global cooperation organisations tend to fall into one of three categories: standard 
setters, operational managers, and service providers.  Regional cooperation 
organisations tend to embody all three characteristics.  They may be formal 
organisations or networks, and they may be uni-dimensional or multi-dimensional.   
Thus regional organisation structures can be grouped into one of four categories (Hettne 
and Soderbaum, 2006): 
  Uni-dimensional organisations which may focus on regional economic 
integration or regional finance (the regional development banks) or which may 




  Multi-dimensional organisations which may drive regional cooperation (such as 
ASEAN), those which enhance collaboration in a river basin, and certain UN 
organisations such as UNESCAP. 
  Uni-dimensional networks promote cooperation and coordination in such 
activities as research and development, and may draw on civil society and 
private commercial parties as well as on public bodies.  A regional electrical 
power pool, such as the Nordpool, is a more technically sophisticated example.  
A particular type of organisation which can be of great value in establishing a 
regional market is the regulatory network (Matthews, 2003; Berg and Horrall, 
2008). 
  Multi-dimensional networks are less common, and include growth triangles, 
development corridors and other micro-regional economic organisations. 
The final organisation of relevance is the research institute, for research underpins 
the improved provision of many types of transnational public good (Hettne and 
Soderbaum, 2006). 
Whatever combination of organisations are developed to promote the supply of 
public goods across a region, a number of general principles should be held in mind.  
First, policy research and operational management should not be considered as separate 
activities, but should be integrated in the same organisations.  Second, the long-term 
aim of the regional organisations and institutions should be to encourage the emergence 
of new behavioural norms that support the delivery of regional public goods, not just to 
enforce them through rules.  Finally, all regional organisations should be linked 
effectively both horizontally to other regional organisations in the same geographical 
area, and vertically to global and national organisations providing public goods.  It may 
also be desirable to build links to regional organisations in adjacent regions in order to 
deliver trans-regional public goods (Hettne and Soderbaum, 2006; Sandler, 2007; 
UNIDO, 2008). 
 
4.5.  Supports for and Constraints to Regional Collaboration  
As mentioned above, the main constraint to the effectiveness of international law 
and to the provision of transnational public goods is sovereignty (Barrett, 2006).    
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Unwillingness to cede any degree of sovereignty to a supranational, regional 
organisation was widespread throughout much of the twentieth century.  Though 
attempts were made by states to collaborate and even to integrate their economies across 
a region, the level of success was modest.  Most of these efforts were defensive in 
nature, seeking to promote economic development through state-centred, protectionist 
approaches with formal rules and exclusive membership.  With the exception of the 
European Union, most of these efforts failed in attaining their objectives for a range of 
economic and political reasons.  The cost of integration was too high, the economic 
diversity among the participating states was too great, and governments lacked both 
political commitment and a willingness to yield sovereignty (Matthews, 2003; Hettne 
and Soderbaum, 2006).    
This ‘old regionalism’ contrasts with the ‘new regionalism’ which takes a more 
open, informal and flexible approach to cooperation.  Membership tends to be open to 
new parties, structures and systems are more heterogeneous and both formal rules and 
binding commitments with penalties for failure are rare.  The typical new regionalism 
seeks to promote market reforms within the region in order to promote trade and 
integration, at the same time as seeking integration with global economic systems.   
From one perspective, the ‘new regionalism’ is to be welcomed as it engenders a higher 
degree of willingness to collaborate (Matthews, 2003; Hettne and Soderbaum, 2006; 
Devlin and Mulder, 2006; Sandler, 2007).  On the other hand, such informal and 
flexible arrangements may be less able to deliver outcomes which require a high degree 
of commitment and contribution from all the parties. 
In addition to these general forces which appear to be providing support for the 
provision of regional public goods, a number of other specific supporting factors can be 
identified which will tend to promote collaboration with a region, for example (Barrett, 
2006; Devlin and Mulder, 2006; Sandler, 2007): 
  A common history or cultural heritage; 
  A common world view, especially with respect to economic and political issues; 
  A perceived common threat; 
  Leadership by one or more nations; 
  A high degree of political will from all or most of the participating states;  
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  The participation of private actors, both commercial and civil society. 
Conversely, regional collaboration can be inhibited or delayed by a wide range of 
factors, for example (Ferroni, 2002; Barrett, 2006; Devlin and Mulder, 2006; Sandler, 
2007; UNIDO, 2008): 
  The length of time needed to achieve noticeable benefits; 
  The need for individual governments to amend national laws, structures and 
systems in order to adhere to the requirements of the collaborative initiatives; 
  The need to compensate those states which either lose from the proposed 
arrangements or which need assistance to meet the required standards; 
  Long-standing rivalries between nations within the region which may undermine 
the emergence of a regional leadership; 
  Unwillingness by one or more nations to cede any degree of sovereignty; 
  A lack of capacity in the regional organisations to support the delivery of the 
public goods; 
  A lack of finance or of a regional body which can provide or transfer finance; 
  A lack of confidence in the willingness of others to deliver on the commitments; 
  The presence of economies with a high degree of state control and ownership. 
The challenge for governments seeking to work together to deliver regional public 
goods is to recognise these constraints and to address them through a combination of (1) 
taking measures to tackle them directly, (2) directing efforts at delivering those goods 
which bring obvious benefits to the greatest number of states, and (3) designing the 
incentives in such a way as to overcome these constraints. 
 
 
5.  Regional Public Goods: Application to the Energy Sector 
 
Section 3 of this report listed a number of elements of the energy system which 
have been identified by others as having characteristics of a public good, namely: 
  Security of energy supply; 
  Emergency response;  
  The prevention of environmental damage;  
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  The supply of energy to the poor; 
  The effective management of primary resources; 
  The efficient supply and use of energy services; 
  The governance of the energy sector; 
  Research and development; 
  Capacity building; 
  The provision of information. 
The aim of this section is to apply the ideas explored in Section 4 to the energy 
sector in order to more explicitly identify which features of the energy sector may be 
considered as regional public goods and how they may be classified and understood in 
this context. 
The first step in this process involves recognising that although many ‘high level’ 
regional policy goals may have features which resemble a public good, they themselves 
comprise a large number of elements which require individual examination.  Such ‘high 
level’ regional policy goals include: 
  Security of energy supply; 
  Economic development; 
  Poverty alleviation; 
  Economic and technical efficiency; 
  Environmental protection. 
The public good character of these policy priorities is taken for granted in this 
study, and, indeed, they are the over-arching policy objectives for EAS in the energy 
sector.  Instead, this study focuses on the more specific services or actions which need 
to be delivered in order to achieve these broader goals.  These will be considered under 
the five heading listed in Section 4.1, namely knowledge, infrastructure, environment, 
health, and security.  Governance, as an intermediate public good, will be examined 
separately. 
 
5.1.  Identifying Regional Public Goods in the Energy Sector 
A preliminary identification and classification of potential services which have 
features of a regional public good and which are required to be delivered in order to  
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build an integrated energy market is shown in Tables 5 and 6.  The aim of these tables is 
to be illustrative rather than exhaustive, and to show how the concept of regional public 
goods may be applied.  
 
5.1.1.  Knowledge 
Knowledge in the broadest sense may be the most important public good required to 
support the development of a regional integrated energy market, because a market 
cannot operate without knowledge.  A large number of types of knowledge have been 
listed in Tables 5 and 6 with the aim of illustrating the range of knowledge that is 
required and the variation in the characteristics of different types of knowledge which in 
turn are likely to affect the provision of the good.  
Pure public goods include the public dissemination of research results, joint public 
pronouncements, the development and dissemination of best practices, and certain types 
of regional early warning systems.  Most of the other types of knowledge are impure 
public gods, mainly on account of the potential for partial excludability.  Capacity 
building, training, events and meetings are generally club goods.  
With respect to the aggregation technology, the key distinction is between those 
goods which are best or better shot and those which are weakest or weaker link.  Best or 
better shot goods include technological research and development, data analysis, 
capacity building and training, the development of best practices, and regional early 
warning systems.  In a region which has one or more countries with the wealth, skills 
and technology, the likelihood of provision of these goods is relatively high, provided 
the leading nations wish to provide them.  In contrast, those goods which are weakest or 
weaker link are more susceptible to the performance of the weaker or more reluctant 
members in the region.  Examples include joint public pronouncements, and the 
provision of data on national energy markets and energy reserves.  The second of these, 








Table 5.  Selected Services which have Features of Regional Public Goods for 
A Regional Integrated Energy Market, Grouped by Field of Activity  
Category Service  Type  of  Good  Aggregator 
Knowledge  Dissemination of research results   Pure PG  Weighted sum 
Joint public pronouncements  Pure PG  Weaker link 
Best practice laws, procedures and 
rules 
Pure PG  Better shot 
Early warning systems  Pure PG  Best shot 
Market and reserves data  Impure PG  Weaker link 
Analysis of data  Impure PG  Better shot 
Technological research and 
development 
Impure PG  Better shot 
Benchmarking data  Impure PG  Threshold 
Capacity building and training  Club G  Better shot 
Events and meetings  Club G  Weighted sum 
Infrastructure  Network construction  Club good  Weighted sum 
Construction of shared infrastructure  Club good  Weighted sum 
Maintaining network integrity, security 
and access 




Providing clean energy to cities and 
households  
Pure PG  Weighted sum 
Effective husbanding of natural 
resources 
Pure PG  Weaker link 
Reducing acid rain  Impure PG  Weighted sum 
Cleaning up after polluting event  Impure PG  Better shot 
Peace and security  Construction of emergency stocks  Pure PG  Better shot 
Emergency stock sharing system  Club G  Weighted sum 
Sea-lane security  Pure PG  Better shot 
Network security  Pure PG  Weakest link 
Emergency response team  Club G  Threshold 
 
Two other groups of knowledge-related public good can be recognised.   
Dissemination of research results and events and meetings involve weighted sum 
aggregation, and the provision of benchmarking data requires threshold aggregation.  
 
5.1.2.  Infrastructure 
The construction and operation of infrastructure to transport energy across a region 
is one of the most fundamental requirements for an integrated energy market.  Such 
infrastructure is required to transport oil, gas, coal and electricity.  Although pipelines 
and electricity grids form the heart of a modern energy transport system, roads, canals, 





Table 6.  Selected Regional Public Goods for a Regional Integrated Energy 
Market, Grouped by Type of Service and Aggregator 
Aggregation 
Technology  Pure Public Good  Impure Public Good  Club Good 
Summation      
Weighted sum  Dissemination of research 
results.  
Providing clean energy to 
cities. 
Reducing acid rain  Network construction. 
Events and meetings. 
Emergency stock sharing 
system. 
Weakest link  Maintaining network 
integrity, security and 
access. 
  
Weaker link  Joint public 
pronouncements. 
Husbanding of natural 
resources. 




Threshold    Benchmarking data.  Emergency response team 
Best shot  Early warning systems     
Better shot  Technology R & D . 
Best practice laws, 




Cleaning up after 
pollution event. 
Analysis of data 




Trans-boundary infrastructure other than networks may also play an important role 
in the development of a regional energy market.  Single infrastructure projects may be 
developed by two (or possibly three) neighbouring states along their shared borders.  
Examples include power plants, dams, oil refineries, LNG terminals, ports, or 
production facilities for an oil or gas field.  Such shared projects are especially relevant 
in cases where resources straddle national boundaries or where individual states lack the 
resources or the requirement to develop the project on their own. 
The construction of trans-boundary infrastructure and regional energy networks is 
usually a club good, from which actors can be excluded, and has features of a weighted 
sum aggregator, as different parties usually make different scales of contribution to the 
project.  In contrast, maintaining the integrity of the network is a pure public good on 
account of the wide benefits this brings to society across the region in terms of 
economic development and poverty alleviation.  However infrastructure integrity is 
often vulnerable to the actions or inactions of the least competent party and therefore 
has a weakest link aggregator.  As a consequence, maintaining the integrity of a regional 
energy network will be much more challenging than constructing it in the first instance.  
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5.1.3.  Environment, Natural Resources and Health 
For the purposes of an analysis of the public good aspects of energy, it is 
appropriate to combine the environmental and health dimensions of energy, for the 
health impacts of energy production and use mainly arise from pollution of different 
types. 
Two examples of energy services which yield pure public goods include the 
provision of clean energy in cities and households, and the effective husbanding or 
management of primary energy resources.  The first involves removing local sources of 
atmospheric pollution produces by vehicles, power stations and industry, and providing 
gas or electricity to households instead of coal or biomass.  This may require the 
provision of clean energy by other countries depending on their ability to supply clean 
energy.  This involves weighted sum aggregation.  The effective management of 
primary energy resources can be considered as a regional or even as a global public 
good, because once they have been wasted then they can usually never be recovered.  
Rather like maintaining the integrity of a network, the management of regional primary 
energy resources has features of a weaker link public good. 
The reduction of greenhouse gas emissions is not addressed here, as that self-
evidently a global public good, though regional approaches may be developed to 
address this challenge.  In contrast, the reduction of acid rain through controlling 
sulphur dioxide emissions from power stations and other industries is certainly a 
regional public good, though impure in nature.  The weighted sum aggregator arises 
from the dependence on the amount of emissions produced by different countries and 
the direction of prevailing winds with respect to the source of pollution and to potential 
areas of damage.  In contrast, cleaning up after a polluting event, such as an oil or 
chemical spill, requires a best shot or better shot aggregator.  
 
5.1.4.  Security 
For reasons discussed above, wider issues relating to security of energy supply are 
not examined here.  Rather the focus is on a number of specific services which have a 
security dimension and which have elements of a regional public good.  
The first two items relate to the ability to manage short-term disruptions in the 
international energy markets.  They involve the construction and filling of emergency  
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stocks of an energy commodity such as oil, gas or coal, and systems for sharing these 
stocks in the event of a market disruption.  The construction and filling of emergency 
stocks is a pure public good, as the existence of such stocks acts to stabilise the market, 
and just a few countries in the region are needed to undertake this task, making it a 
better shot aggregator.  Indeed, given the global nature of the oil market, the 
construction of oil stocks may better be considered as a global public good.  In contrast, 
any system for sharing the stocks in the case of an emergency is a club good, and is 
subject to a weighted sum aggregator as different players will have different capacities 
and willingness to share. 
The provision of physical security to energy transport routes is an important pure 
regional public good that all parties benefit from.  Sea-lane security can be provided by 
one or more powerful states, making the aggregator best or better shot, whilst the 
security of onshore networks more closely resembles a weaker link good as a network is 
only as secure as its most vulnerable point. 
The final example is the emergency response team created, trained and resourced to 
provide the initial response to an accident or natural disaster which affects an energy 
system, for example an explosion in a production or transportation facility.  Unlike the 
clean-up operation which is an impure public good, the emergency response team is 
most likely a club good to which only certain countries contribute and from which only 
these countries benefit.  The ability of the response team to react to emergencies in 
countries outside the ‘club’ may be constrained not only by the rules of the ‘club’ but 
also by the physical distance to other countries.  The aggregator is of the threshold type, 
as an inadequate emergency response capability is usually unable to effect any 
meaningful action. 
 
5.2.  Governance for the Provision Regional Public Goods in the Energy Sector 
As was noted above, the collective action required to deliver public goods at 
regional or trans-regional scales requires governance.  The word ‘governance’ can be 
interpreted and applied in different ways.  For international economic organisations, 
governance involves the management of economic and social affairs by government; for 
example through the allocation of public resources and the resolution of conflicts 
between actors, through the exercise of political authority, through the establishment  
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and operation of institutions, and through the formulation and implementation of 
policies (World Bank, 1992).  Measures of governance quality include accountability, 
participation, predictability, transparency, efficiency and effectiveness (Asian 
Development Bank, 1995).  
In contrast, transaction cost economics and new institutional economics express the 
concept of governance in much more general terms.  In the words of Oliver Williamson 
“Governance is an effort to craft order, mitigate conflict and realise mutual gains” 
(Williamson, 2000).  This approach focuses on the governance of economic transactions 
where a transaction is defined as the transfer of a physical good, a commodity, a legal 
right or a natural resource between actors (Williamson, 2000; Hagedoorn 2009).  In this 
context a governance structure may be “thought of as an institutional framework in 
which the integrity of a transaction, or related set of transactions, is decided” 
(Williamson, 1996, p.11). 
Both definitions are relevant to this study, because effective governance is required 
at supra-national and national levels and at the level of the individual economic 
transaction.  In order to determine the most appropriate form of governance for the 
provision of energy public goods across a region, a number of questions need to be 
addressed, as already indicated in the previous section: 
  What are the overall objectives of the programme for energy cooperation? 
  What incentives are needed to deliver the required public goods? 
  What are the main supporting and constraining factors? 
  Over what region or regions should this cooperation take place? 
  What organisations of governance may be suited to these circumstances? 
The first question to be addressed by the parties relates to the degree to which they 
seek to integrate their national energy markets.  At one extreme, they might wish to 
embark on an ambitious programme to create a seamless regional energy market across 
which capital, commodities and services would flow freely, in the manner of the 
European Union’s intended “single energy market”.  At the other extreme, the parties 
might prefer to restrict their cooperation to a few of the most needed energy services.  In 
between these two extreme lie a range of options involving policy coordination and 
harmonisation, collaboration in the provision of selected public goods, and partial  
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market integration between certain groups of countries in the region.  Which approach is 
preferable or even feasible will to a great extent be determined by the other factors 
being examined in this section. 
The nature of the incentives which will be required to provide the public goods will 
depend on the nature of the service and of the aggregator.  Coordination and 
cooperation between nation states is a prerequisite for the provision of all regional 
public goods.  What will vary is the extent to which rights, obligations and sanctions 
must be embodied in a formal treaty.  Certain goods with summation or weighted sum 
aggregators are likely to require treaties, for example the construction of networks, a 
sharing system for emergency stocks, and the reduction of acid rain.  In the case of club 
goods, those parties who do not wish to participate can easily be excluded and the 
agreement can be concluded without excessive difficulty.  The provision of best shot or 
better shot goods such as early warning systems, research and development, pollution 
clean-up and the construction of emergency stocks only needs key parties to be willing 
to provide the service and to cooperate in its provision.  
Weakest and weaker link goods are constrained by the inability or unwillingness of 
parties to collaborate in supply the good.  Inability can be addressed through financial or 
technical support, for example in maintaining network integrity.  But unwillingness to 
provide may be rooted in the political culture or in national attitudes towards 
sovereignty.  The provision of data on national energy markets and energy reserves, and 
the management of primary energy resources are likely to be liable to such a constraint.  
Of more fundamental importance will be the inability or unwillingness of certain 
governments to open their energy sectors to foreign investment, to reform their systems 
for energy pricing, to remove the monopoly rights of the national energy champions, 
and to provide third-party access to energy infrastructure.  These constraints to EMI are 
illustrated in the case of the European Union, as will be shown in the next section. 
The supports for and constraints to regional collaboration elaborated in Section 4.5 
are all applicable to the energy sector.  Of particular relevance is the need for leadership 
from one or more nations and for a common world view relating to economics and 
politics.  This arises from the profound relationship between energy, on the one hand, 
and national sovereignty and national security, on the other.  The full integration of 
energy markets requires governments to cede ownership over their state-owned energy  
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enterprises, to promote inward investment in the exploitation of primary energy 
resources, and to relax their control over domestic energy markets.  Even less ambitious 
collaboration will require changes to national laws, structures and systems relating to 
energy.  Rivalry between those nations which should be providing regional leadership 
and the need for cross-subsidies between nations may also prove important barriers to 
progress.  
The geographic extent of collaboration in the provision of energy public goods will 
depend on (1) the geographic extent of the spill-over benefits from this collaboration 
and (2) economies of scale and of scope.  The extent of the spill-over from the provision 
of energy public goods is highly variable.  Some goods may have spill-overs which are 
very wide and may even extend beyond the region.  Examples include the construction 
and filling of emergency stocks, research and development, and sea-lane security.   
Others, such as the construction and operation of an energy network, yield benefits 
mainly to those connected to the grid.  Emergency response teams and pollution clean-
up capacity will also have geographic limitations.  
For a large region in which the countries seek to collaborate in a number of energy 
activities, the geographic extent of the spill-over from each activity is likely to be highly 
variable depending on such factors as the physical geography, the nature and location of 
energy resources, the location of centres of energy demand, and the degree of economic 
development.  As a consequence it may be necessary to group activities into two or 
more levels of geographic spill-over, creating a hierarchy in which activities which 
cover the entire region are managed at the highest level; whereas those activities which 
most appropriately involve a sub-set of the parties are managed at lower levels, with the 
higher level of governance providing coordination.  In other words, the larger ‘region’ 
could be divided into smaller ‘sub-regions’ for the provision of certain goods with a 
more limited spill-over.  In this respect, the coordination between the ‘sub-regions’ 
would resemble the provision of trans-regional public goods mentioned in Section 4.  
The type of organisation or organisations which are required will depend on three 
main factors: 
  The overall goal of the regional energy cooperation; 
  The nature of the regionalism;  
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  The nature of the specific activities to be coordinated. 
As noted in Section 4.4, full regional integration which is intended to lead to a 
single regional energy market with free movement of commodities, capital and services 
will require a sophisticated system of rules and incentives.  This may, in turn, require a 
formal supra-national organisation with powers of enforcement as is exemplified by the 
European Union, or at least formal and wide-ranging treaty such as the Energy Charter 
Treaty.  Whether this is necessary, desirable or even feasible will depend on the nature 
of the emerging regionalism.  Whilst formal supranational governance structures may be 
desirable in principle, such an approach is characteristic of the ‘old regionalism’.  In 
contrast, ‘new regionalism’ prefers arrangements which are less formal and which lack 
binding commitments and enforceable sanctions.  In these circumstances, it might prove 
difficult to move ahead with certain initiatives which involve substantial commitments 
from a large numbers of countries in the region.  
Instead, effort may be best directed at making progress incrementally by focusing 
on a limited number of activities involving countries which are clearly able and willing 
to participate.  Different organisations could then be created to manage defined sets of 
activities over certain ‘sub-regions’, under the overall coordination of the high-level 
regional organisation.  The sub-ordinate entities could be structured in a manner so as to 
take advantage of potential economies of scale and scope, and to prevent a proliferation 
of entities.  Some of these entities will be formal organisations with specific 
responsibilities for overseeing the implementation of certain activities such as cross-
border energy transport or environmental protection, others may take the form of 
informal networks addressing research, development, information and even regulation. 
 
 
6.  Lessons from the European Experience 
 
Whilst the European Union (EU) may seem remote from East Asia in physical, 
cultural, political and economic respects, its experience in attempting to develop an 
integrated energy market has relevance to the EAS, if only on account of the length of 
time this process of EMI has been running in the EU.  The aim of this section is to  
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briefly identify some lessons from the European experience which may be relevant to 
East Asia. 
Formal collaboration between European countries in the field of energy began in the 
early 1950s with the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community and the 
European Atomic Energy community.  The first of these was created with the express 
ambition of building a common market for coal, then the most important source of 
energy.  The next significant step taken was progressive development from 1968 
onwards of emergency response mechanisms to react to disruptions to oil supplies, 
including the construction of oil stocks (Matlary, 1997). 
A key feature of the EU is that the member states cede partial sovereignty to the 
institutions of the EU: to the Council of Europe which comprises the heads of 
government of each member state, to the European Commission which is a large and 
powerful civil service, and to the European Parliament which has members directly 
elected from the member states.  Of these three bodies, it has been the Commission 
which has been the most active in promoting the single European energy market. 
It was in 1986 that the Council of Europe first agreed on the need for greater 
integration of national energy markets and in 1988 it was resolved to introduce single 
internal energy market.  A decade of proposals, drafting and negotiating then took place.  
The most significant measure to emerge was the Directive on Hydrocarbons Licensing 
which was issued in 1994 (Cross et al., 2001).  Though not obliging member states to 
open their territories for hydrocarbon exploration and production, the Directive did lay 
down procedures to be followed once such a decision had been made in order to 
minimise discrimination against companies from other member states.  Legally-binding 
Directives relating to price transparency and to electricity and gas transit were issued, 
and Common Rules covering the removal of monopoly rights, the unbundling of 
vertically-integrated utilities and third-party access to transmission infrastructure were 
drafted (Lyons, 1996; Cameron, 2002).  
Despite all these formal measures, little was achieved towards building a single 
energy market until 1996 and 1998 when the Electricity and Gas Directives respectively 
were adopted.  This breakthrough was assisted by the progressive emergence of 
competitive energy markets at national level, for example in the United Kingdom, 
Germany, the Nordic countries, the Netherlands and Spain (Egenhofer, 1997).  Despite  
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this positive influence, the level of opposition to the Commission’s core ideas remained 
high.  As a consequence these Directives reflected compromise solutions to many key 
issues including third-party access to energy infrastructure and unbundling of utilities.  
Further, these Directives focused on the liberalisation of national markets and they 
failed to address key obstacles to the promotion of cross-border energy trade.  One 
significant step towards addressing this deficiency was the establishment in 1998 and 
1999 of Forums for the national electricity and gas regulators respectively (Cameron, 
2002).  These soon merged to form the Council of European Energy Regulators, an 
independent body which seeks to promote the development of the single energy market 
through providing coordination between national regulators and between these 
regulators and the European Commission.  
Further Directives concerning the development of Europe-wide electricity and gas 
markets were adopted in 2003, but little progress was being made towards the creation 
of a single energy market.  In 2007, the Council of Europe issued an “Energy Policy for 
Europe” which showed renewed political commitment at the highest level to the single 
European energy market, with three objectives: security of energy supply, a competitive 
energy market, and the environment, particularly climate change (de Jong, 2008).  New 
measures were required to push forward EMI, and specifically to address continuing 
obstacles, for example (Nowak, 2010): 
  The dominant position in markets of certain national energy companies and the 
high degree of vertical integration of many of these companies, features which 
provide high barriers to entry for competitors and prevent access to transmission 
grids; 
  The distortion of competition through inappropriate price regulation; 
  The insufficient independence of national energy regulators; 
  A shortage of cross-border transmission capacity and high prices for access to 
such capacity.  
A so-called ‘Third Energy Package’ of proposed measures was published in 2009 
and took effect from March 2011.  The main components are (Stanic, 2011): 
  Unbundling of transmission from production and supply activities; 
  Stronger powers and independence of national regulators;  
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  New rules to harmonise market and network operations across Europe, 
  Higher standards of public service obligations and consumer protection; 
  New institutions to promote cooperation between regulators and between 
transmission system operators. 
The centrepiece of this new legislation was to have been the mandatory ownership 
unbundling of vertically-integrated energy utilities.  The aim was to radically reduce the 
ability of energy companies to act in an anti-competitive fashion, in particular by 
restricting third-party access to transmission networks and by constraining investment in 
new network capacity.  This proposal was over-ruled by two powerful member states, 
Germany and France (Nowak, 2010).  As a result, countries may choose one of three 
forms of unbundling: 
  Ownership unbundling; 
  The creation of a independent system operator which leases the network from 
the utility; 
  The creation of an independent transmission system operator which remains 
within the utility. 
It is too early to say how well these new measures will succeed.  But this brief 
history shows that much remains to be achieved twenty three years after the first formal 
declaration of the need to develop a single energy market in 1988.  National interests 
relating to the support of national champions and the management of domestic energy 
markets still act to constrain progress on key issues.  A small number of powerful 
interests have colluded to block progress for many years, and great determination and 
persistence has been required on the part of the Commission to sustain forward 
movement.  In the field of energy, national interests appear to over-ride the collective 
interest (Eikeland, 2004), despite the relatively high degree of commonality in customs, 
norms and values across the member states with respect to culture, politics and 
economics. 
This pessimistic evaluation of European energy policy has to be set alongside real 
progress in many respects.  Of particular relevance to the theme of the single European 
energy market has been the gradual development of smaller regional energy markets 
within the EU which has been supported by the Commission and by the regulators since  
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2004.  These markets take advantage of proximity between nations and of existing 
network links.  These sub-regional networks have allowed local economic benefit to be 
realised by the participating states and can provide the building blocks for later 
integration to form a Europe-wide market once the necessary infrastructure has been 
built (de Jong, 2008).  This suggests that EMI requires bottom-up initiatives as well as 
top down persuasion and enforcement. 
 
 
7.  Application to Energy Market Integration East Asia 
 
The development of a fully integrated energy market across the East Asian region 
will prove to be an ambitious undertaking and could take several decades to accomplish.  
Achieving even the more modest objective of gradual and partial market integration will 
require sustained effort, determination and leadership.  A very wide range of tasks need 
to be undertaken, some of which will be straightforward and others of which will be 
much more difficult.  The application of regional public goods theory to EMI allows us 
to identify features in the region which may support and which may constrain EMI.  It 
also provides a framework for assessing the type and geographic scope of governance 
required.  The experience of the EU further illustrates the difficulties involved and 
highlights certain key obstacles to progress. 
EMI requires a number of regional actions to be taken and services to be provided 
which have features of a regional public good.  Some of these are illustrated in Tables 5 
and 6.  Governance has not been included in these tables for it is considered as an 
intermediate public good – that is to say, appropriate governance is the service which 
has to be provided in order that these other public goods can be delivered.  Given the 
special nature of energy, its importance to national economic development, to national 
security and to national sovereignty, governance is the most critical public good 
required to deliver a regional energy market. 
East Asia has a number of factors which tend to support steps to EMI.  These 
include: 
  Geographic contiguity, albeit over a vast distance;  
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  Certain commonalities of outlook and a general willingness to cooperate on 
economic issues (Dent, 2008); 
  Complementarity across the region in terms of energy supply and demand, and 
energy mix; 
  A number of countries with advanced economies and technological expertise 
which can act as best shot or better shot suppliers of public goods (for example, 
the first group in Table 2); 
  A number of countries which can, in principle, act as political leaders in the 
integration process (a number of countries from the first and second groups in 
Table 2); 
Set against these supporting factors are a number of potential constraints which 
include: 
  The large geographic size of the East Asian region, along with the significant 
physical barriers across the region such as oceans and mountain ranges; 
  A high degree of divergence with respect to history, culture, economics, and 
politics; 
  Long-standing rivalries between key nations which potentially could provide 
leadership, as well as major unresolved security challenges and a strong 
emphasis on national sovereignty (Gurtov, 2002; Lincoln, 2004; Rozman, 2004); 
  A number of very poor countries in a  key location in the region which could 
prove to be weaker link actors in the management of regional infrastructure (for 
example, the fourth group in Table 2); 
  A high degree of variability between the national energy sectors with respect to 
degree of development, ownership, market structure, and policy priorities.  
These constraining factors will affect not only the provision of specific services, 
such as those listed in Tables 5 and 6, but will also restrict the rate at which effective 
governance systems which span the region can be developed.  Of particular significance 
are issues relating to perceptions of national security, national sovereignty and state 
control of the energy industry.  These concerns are likely to impede the reduction of 
market barriers, especially those relating to third-party access to energy infrastructure 
and to the monopoly power of national energy companies.  
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The experience of the EU shows that decades may be needed to make significant 
progress on some of these governance issues.  The EU has many advantages over the 
East Asian region in terms of geographical size and contiguity, political and economic 
outlook, and the success in integrating markets for other goods and services.  The key 
lesson from the EU experience is that full EMI can only proceed as rapidly as the 
slowest nation, or at least as the slowest nation with a key role to play in the market.  
The progress in developing the single European energy market has, in simple terms, 
followed the degree of acceptance of the idea of energy market liberalisation.  During 
those periods in which the European public have increased their acceptance of the idea, 
there has been subsequent progress in integration.  When the idea of energy market 
liberalisation is called into question, so is the ambition of EMI. 
Despite the slow progress of EMI in Europe, a number of regional public goods in 
the energy sector are being delivered at a Europe-wide scale, and sub-regional market 
integration is moving ahead.  The implications for the East Asian region are two-fold. 
Firstly, EMI should be pursued initially at sub-regional level.  Secondly, the delivery of 
specific services at sub-regional level will support the eventual development of an 
integrated energy market.  The specific energy services which could be delivered are 
best considered according to their degree of ‘publicness’ and to their aggregation 
technology.   
The construction of trans-boundary infrastructure is in many respects a club good 
(though the operation of it has wider public goods benefits) and can therefore be 
delivered with a discrete number of willing and competent states.  Given that oil and, to 
a lesser extent, coal are fungible commodities traded across global markets, the 
development of an integrated energy market mainly involves electricity and gas which 
in turn requires the construction and operation of transmission infrastructure.  These are 
best constructed and operated at sub-regional level, in south-east and north-east Asia, 
but such markets will still face the operational challenges common to weaker and 
weakest link goods.  
Trans-boundary infrastructure can also include projects that occupy a single 
location straddling an international boundary.  These include power plants, dams, oil 
refineries, LNG terminals, ports, or production facilities for an oil or gas field.  Given 
their weighted sum character, the delivery these infrastructure projects, as well as other  
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club goods such as acid rain reduction and emergency stock sharing systems, will 
require very close collaboration between the participating states and, probably, formal 
legally-binding commitments from the parties. 
A number of services or facilities which resemble best shot or better shot goods can 
be, or are already being delivered through the efforts of a small number of leading 
nations, for example: 
  Early warning systems; 
  Technological research and development; 
  Best practice laws, regulations procedures and rules; 
  Emergency stock construction 
  Sea-lane security; 
  Cleaning up after a pollution event; 
  Analysis of data; 
  Capacity building and training. 
Except in the case of best shot goods which are delivered by a single nation, the 
effective delivery of these goods requires not only that the leading nations be prepared 
to deliver the good but also that they work together in a coordinated manner.  This in 
turn raises the question of the geographical extent over which such coordination and 
delivery should take place.  Many of the goods on this list could indeed be delivered 
across the East Asian region, but sea-lane security and cleaning up after a pollution 
event may better be provided at sub-regional level. 
Services with weakest and weaker link features arguably provide the greatest 
challenge.  Not only is delivery dependent on the ability and willingness of ‘weak’ 
states to participate effectively, but certain of these services are critical to the effective 
functioning of a regional energy market, for example: 
  The availability of market and reserves data; 
  The maintenance of network integrity and security; 
  The effective husbanding of natural resources. 
Each of these services is closely dependent on the nature of national systems of 
energy governance and on perceptions of national security.  If nations which are vital in 
terms of energy supply or demand or in terms of location along network infrastructure  
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are unable or unwilling to provide these goods, then the regional energy market is 
seriously undermined.  In the case of East Asia, a number of countries which currently 
would be unable or unwilling to provide these public goods may be identified.  As a 
consequence, progress towards an integrated energy market will have to be selective in 
terms of geographical area and in terms of the component goods to be delivered. 
The design of the institutions of governance will depend on the nature of the 
governance required and on the geographic extent of the spill-over, taking into account 
economies of scale and scope, as discussed in Sections 4 and 5.  Given the current state 
of development of the energy market in the East Asian region and the range of goods to 
be provided, these considerations suggest that a hierarchy of institutions be created, 
building on those which already exist.  
At the highest level, an organisation could be established to provide coordination 
across the East Asian region:  
  coordination of certain goods which are being delivered across the whole region, 
for example best shot and better shot goods, and any summation or weighted 
sum goods being delivered at regional level; 
  coordination between sub-regional initiatives of different types. 
At sub-regional level, a number of institutions may evolve depending on the region 
across which different goods are being developed and the nature of the governance 
required, for example coordination, treaty or governing body.  In the case of the East 
Asian region, the challenge will be to design such institutions in a way which achieves 
economies of scale and scope.  Whilst ASEAN and the countries of north-east Asia 
form natural geographic groupings, the effective inclusion of other states in sub-regional 
governing institutions may prove more problematic.  
 
 
8.  Policy Implications for the East Asian Summit 
 
EMI has the potential to yield widespread economic benefits across East Asia, and 
some of these benefits have features of a public good.  Whilst full EMI to form a single  
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energy market is a task requiring decades of work, certain steps can be taken to move 
towards integration.  
EMI in East Asia faces a number of obstacles, geographic, political and economic.  
The most intractable of these relate to issues relating to national security, national 
sovereignty and state control of the energy sector.  The implications are two-fold: 
1.  EMI should proceed initially at sub-regional level, rather than across the entire 
East Asian region; 
2.  The specific steps taken towards EMI should be chosen on the basis of their 
likely positive economic impacts and their likely ease of delivery. 
In this respect, initiatives such as the Trans-ASEAN Gas Pipeline and the ASEAN 
Power Grid, and proposals for sub-regional energy networks in Northeast Asia are to be 
encouraged and actively pursued.  Given the geographic size of East Asia, these 
networks are likely to be restricted in scale to sub-regions rather than spanning the 
entire region, though the progressive development of national networks and trans-
boundary interconnections may eventually allow some of these networks to span a large 
part of the region.  The construction of such infrastructure projects can be undertaken by 
‘coalitions of the willing’, and those states which do not wish to or are unable to 
participate can be excluded.  If necessary, certain participating states can bear a 
disproportionate share of the costs, though raising finance from private sources may be 
difficult if key issues relating to the operation of these projects are not satisfactorily 
addressed.  
Legally binding agreements will almost certainly be required for most of major, 
trans-boundary infrastructure projects to proceed, on account of the costs and risks 
involved.  In the early years of EMI, it is likely that most legally binding agreements 
will be concluded at sub-regional, bi-lateral or tri-lateral levels, rather than across the 
entire region. 
Whilst the costs and risks relating to the construction of transnational infrastructure 
projects are relatively easily managed, the real challenges emerge once they are 
commissioned, even if formal agreements are in place.  On the one hand, they are open 
to deficient behaviour on the part of weakest link actors with respect to the operational 
integrity and security of the network.  On the other hand, they are vulnerable to 
unilateral actions by one or more parties seeking to protect corporate or national  
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interests, for example by denying access to the network.  These difficulties can only be 
alleviated by the progressive convergence over time between the participating nations in 
respect of their improved competence in national governance and the openness of their 
national energy markets.  
Indeed, openness and governance at national level (as well as at supra-national 
level) are key pre-requisites for EMI to proceed and to deliver significant regional 
benefits.  States need to be open in their provision of information on energy resources 
and energy markets, and they need to be open in their provision of investment 
opportunities in their energy sectors.  Effective and appropriate governance is needed in 
two respects.  First, the domestic energy resources and industries should be regulated so 
as to use the available resources in as efficient and clean a manner as possible.  Second, 
the structure and nature of the national energy industries and energy markets should be 
amenable to effective and efficient EMI.  In many of the nations of East Asia, these 
attributes will require substantial domestic reforms (see also ERIA, 2010).  Without 
such reforms, the progress of EMI will be severely constrained. 
For these reasons, further analysis is necessary on the governance of the trans-
boundary energy infrastructure and on the need for improved governance and openness 
in national energy sectors in the EAS region. 
Other initiatives which should be pursued at a sub-regional scale, provided 
appropriate nations emerge to take the lead, include: sea-lane security, emergency 
response teams and pollution clean-up capacity.   
A number of less tangible actions are already being taken in the East Asia region 
and these will provide long-term support to the progressive EMI.  They include:  
  technological research and development; 
  the establishment and harmonisation of technical standards, such as the EAS-
ERIA biodiesel fuel standards; 
  the development and dissemination of best practices, for example in energy 
efficiency or in nuclear energy safety;  




  capacity building and training in a range of fields including technology, 
management, policy and governance fields.  
The relative degree of success of such programmes arises from the fact that much of 
the cost can be borne by a limited number of nations, whereas the benefits are 
widespread.  Efforts should be made to enhance these programmes, and to ensure that 
their scope and impact is regional not just sub-regional. 
The construction of gas stocks should be promoted.  The issue of emergency stocks 
has a number of dimensions.  In the case of oil, it could be argued that the IEA member 
states in the EAS region already hold sufficient stocks and that non-member states 
should just free-ride, unless a non-member state chooses to build its own stocks in order 
to use the stock in a different manner from the IEA member states.  The case of natural 
gas is different.  Gas markets which depend on trans-boundary pipelines are, by their 
nature, regional.  It is therefore incumbent on the parties involved in that regional 
market to construct suitable stocks, to agree how such stocks should be used, and to 
abide by this agreement.  Whilst the construction of these stocks can be carried out by a 
small number of more competent states, the effective use of these stocks is a potential a 
source of tension as a consequence of different national priorities.  This issue is of 
immediate relevance to the Trans-ASEAN Gas Pipeline. 
Because of the special nature of energy, the development of an integrated energy 
market requires relatively sophisticated systems of energy governance, some of which 
will need to be legally-binding and will require states to yield a certain degree of 
authority to a supra-national institution.  Given the geographic extent and heterogeneity 
of the East Asian region, this study proposes that a single high level organisation 
spanning the entire region is formed with the task of coordinating (1) the delivery of 
certain services and activities which are delivered across the whole region and (2) the 
various sub-regional initiatives.  
If not already in existence, organisations can be established at sub-regional level to 
oversee the delivery of services at this level.  Given the well-established nature of 
ASEAN, it should form the basis of those organisations overseeing or regulating 
activities in Southeast Asia.  This would achieve economies of scale and scope.  Other 
types of organisation are likely to prove useful at local levels, for example the Mekong 
River Basin Commission.    
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Steps should be taken to develop a formal organisation for multi-lateral energy 
cooperation in Northeast Asia.  In contrast to Southeast Asia, Northeast Asia lacks an 
established multi-lateral organisation which can provide support for sub-regional energy 
integration.  The Tumen River Area Development Programme which involved China, 
South Korea, Mongolia and Russia is long defunct, the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organisation is built around Central Asia not East Asia, and the Six-Party Talks (which 
includes all the key players in Northeast Asia) is directed purely at security threats on 
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